"During most of the 20th
century the Church of Sweden was a typical example of a northern European
established national church, even a state church. The separation of church and
state had been discussed repeatedly during most of the century, without
reaching an overall solution. Yet, in the early 1990’s a compromise was reached
and the relationship between church and state in Sweden was transformed,
simultaneously transforming the Church of Sweden, seemingly transferring it
from the public sector to the private sector. This paper offers an analysis of
this reform, including how the issue was framed and the arguments used to
legitimize the reform. It also offers an analysis of what the reform changed in
terms of the relationship between the Church and the state, arguing that a
strong relationship between state and religious denominations still exist in
Sweden, even though several steps have been taken towards considering Lutheran
Christianity one religion among many in a society where the state is neutral in
religious affairs, but not reducing the Church of Sweden to one denomination among
many. Instead, the reform has left the Church as a legally regulated entity in
the borderland between state and third sector, while at the same time
strengthening the relationship between the government and other denominations.
In spite of this, the changed relationship between church and state may have
enabled the Church of Sweden to take a more active part in Swedish society,
both in terms of politics and in terms of welfare production.
The aim of the paper is to
discern what changed in the relationship between the Church of Sweden and the
state through the reform of 2000, which arguments, or norms, legitimized the
change, and how the relationship between the Church of Sweden and the state
could be described, in terms of state and third sector relations, today.
Studies of the third sector in Sweden have often focused on the
membership-based popular movement organization, and more recently on the
growing role of the third sector as a provider of welfare services (e.g.
Wijkström 1997, Trägårdh 2011, Rothstein & Trägårdh 2007), thus ignoring
the special features of the Church of Sweden. Yet, the Church of Sweden is not
only the largest and richest third sector organization in the country (SCB 2014)
but also one which has had a large and often overlooked role in the development
of the Swedish welfare state (Berggren & Trägårdh 2015, Naumann 2014, Wijkström
2014). This paper will thus contribute to our understanding of the role played
today by the Church of Sweden as a central actor in the borderlands between
state and civil society in Sweden today. By extension, it will also contribute
to our understanding of the roles of the Protestant established national
churches in general, a subject which has arguably been the subject of fewer
studies than secularization processes in other parts of Western Christianity
(Casanova 2014).
[...]
After the reform of year
2000, the Church has significantly more third-sector characteristics. It exists
as a group of distinct legally enabled organizations, which are all legally
considered to be separate from the state. They are also clearly non-profit
organizations and classified as such for tax purposes. The Church is primarily
funded by membership fees and membership is now voluntary, requiring a
voluntary action, such as baptism. Even though this action may be performed on
the initiative of the parents of an infant, it contrasts sharply with the
previous automatic membership assigned to every newborn. From the viewpoint of
Salmon’s and Anheier’s (1997) definition of the third sector, the Church of
Sweden is now a third sector organization.
However, the registration of
religious denominations and their specific relation to the tax office also
suggests that while the Church of Sweden is now treated more similarly to other
registered denominations, this does not only imply an increased distance
between the Church of Sweden and the state, but also a closer relation between
the state and the other registered denominations, mediated through the National
Council of Religious Denominations. This relationship could be considered
neo-corporative, and thus conforming to how the Swedish state typically relates
to third sector organizations (cf. Harding 2013). This is fully in line with the main argument
used for further separating Church and state; that the increased religious
pluralism of Swedish society demanded a more equal treatment of religious
denominations, without the state unduly favoring any single denomination. It is
also in line with another central argument for the separation, namely that the
creation of a democratic structure for the Church of Sweden enabled it to act
as a legitimate democratic organization; while democratic legitimacy had
previously been provided through the democratic organs of the state regulating the
Church (Harding 2015), the Church was now itself a democratic organization
fulfilling the basic criteria for democracy as viewed in the Swedish third
sector.
The relationship between the
Church of Sweden and the state is also not entirely the same as that of the
other registered denominations and the state. The Law on the Church of Sweden
regulates both the organizational structure of the Church of Sweden and its
creed. It is interesting to note that the many properties and entities in the
Church of Sweden which could be seen as forerunners of modern civil society,
e.g. self-owning parish churches and foundation-like properties dedicated to
finance certain purposes, have now been transferred to (at least partially) membership-based
organizations, primarily Church parishes. This does not simply constitute a
step towards, or away, from the third sector in relation to the modern state. This
aspect of the reform is better described as an adaption of proto-third-sector
features to the standard modes of organization in the modern Swedish third
sector. The same could be said of the establishment of elected assemblies and
boards representing the members of the Church, i.e. representing a democratic
form of legitimacy in organizational authority, contrasting to the authority of
the clerical hierarchy, but similar to the democracy of popular movements, and
even more similar to that of the secular public sector.
While the government and the
new legislation supported both, the democratic and the clerical aspects of Church
organization, it is also evident that the government commissions considered the
introduction of these democratically legitimated bodies an important step
towards establishing a form of organization which would legitimate the Church
as an independent organization. In this sense, the reforms could be considered
to constitute an adaption of the organization of the Church to the isomorphic
norms of Swedish civil society, what has been metaphorically described as a
‘popular-movement marinade’, in which the Swedish third sector is marinated. That
the Church continues to perform delegated government responsibilities – whether
providing for funerals, preserving cultural heritage, or providing welfare
services – does not make it less independent, at least not in theory.
Many experts are now seeing
a tendency that the Swedish third sector is taking a more active role in in
welfare services, which were previously generally viewed as responsibilities of
the welfare state. The third sector is finding new roles as a provider of
welfare services, not just as advocacy organizations or interest groups. The
Church of Sweden and organizations close to it have always provided such
services, but it now appears to be acting more freely as an advocacy
organization, as well as a service provider (cf. Wijkström 2014). There is thus
reason to believe that the Church of Sweden will continue to adapt to the norms
the Swedish third sector, even when those norms may be changing, adapting the
popular movement organization to new normative concepts originating in the
public sector, as well as in the market, and in the international third sector.
While the reforms discussed
in this paper can be considered to have increased the distance between church
and state – in that the Church of Sweden is now more distinct as a separate
non-profit entity – it cannot be considered fully independent as long as both
its organizational form and its religious creed remain legally regulated. The
continued influence of political parties in Church affairs also represents a
strong organizational connection between the church and the state. The
transferal of many church properties from pre- or early-modern foundation-like
institutions to membership-based organizations represents a decrease in
legislative regulation, but also increased opportunities for political control.
This too, could be considered to be in line with the reasoning of the
commissions. It does indeed appear to have been in line with the will of the
Church, as organized at the time."
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